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1N RE BURGER BOYS: ARE LANDLORDS BEING
GRILLED IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT?*
Michael N. Gottfried and Andrew N. Goldmant
INTRODUCTION
A business which files for chapter 11 relief invokes a re-
structuring process rooted in equity. Its corporate mission is
transformed from the paramount one of maximizing sharehold-
er wealth to the three-fold concerns of (i) equitably reordering
the existing debtor-creditor, creditor-creditor and, where the
debtor is solvent, the debtor-equity relationships, (ii) maximiz-
ing assets available for distribution to these constituents, and
(iii) positioning the asset, liability and cashflow structure of
the surviving business (if one is to survive) in a manner that
ensures its long-term viability. Stated differently, the interests
of shareholders leave the forefront in the bankruptcy arena
and in their stead steps up the interests of creditors. This
fundamental transformation of corporate focus is the quid pro
quo for creditors suspending, and ultimately losing, the right
to collect most types of debts of the debtor's business that
arose prior to the bankruptcy filing ("pre-petitione).
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The process codified in title 11 of the United States Code1
(the "Code") has powerful and invasive features2 designed to
permit the efficient and fair reordering of a vast array of cred-
itor and equityholder interests. Inevitably, disputes will arise
between the debtor and parties whose interests are being ad-
versely affected by the prosecution of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. This Article focuses on one such class of disputes that is
often at the fore of chapter 11 proceedings; namely the cantan-
kerous disputes between a debtor and its landlord involving
the respective rights of each with regard to one or more unex-
pired leases of nonresidential real property.
The Bankruptcy Code alters the rights and obligations of
parties to an unexpired nonresidential lease of real property in
many different ways. For example, the commencement of a
bankruptcy proceeding affords a debtor an immediate, but
temporary, spell from any pending litigation, including liti-
gation involving its landlord. The Code also provides the debtor
with a fixed period of time, which is initially set by statute at
sixty days from the commencement of the case (the "Assump-
tion Period"), to determine whether to retain, relinquish or
assign its rights to each of its leases of nonresidential real
property. This window of time, which is codified in sec-
tion 365(d)(4) of the Code, affords the debtor a period of time
within which to conduct due diligence before determining
whether or not a particular lease serves its long-term strategic
interests.3
While a debtor is afforded the opportunity to implement
an orderly restructuring of its affairs, the bankruptcy process
does not contemplate that a debtor will avail itself of the tem-
1 1 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2 The most notable of which are i) the automatic stay of most collection pro-
ceedings during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, and (ii) the right of a debtor
under appropriate circumstances to discharge certain of its preexisting debts at the
conclusion of the bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 1141 (1994).
' Section 365(d)(4) states:
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of
this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee within
60 days after the date of the order for relief, or within such additional
time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such
lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender
such nonresidential real property to the lessor.
11 U.S.C. §365(d)(4) (1994).
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porary reprieve from paying preexisting debts and thereafter
unfurl new prejudice upon those landlords that voluntarily
choose, or are involuntarily forced, to do business with the
debtor while it is within the shelter of the chapter 11 process.
Rather, landlords (and other creditors) are provided the com-
fort of knowing that the debtor will remain current on obliga-
tions which arise after the commencement of the bankruptcy
case ("post-petition") while the debtor attempts to implement
an orderly process designed to rehabilitate its business. To this
end, section 365(d)(3)4 of the Code mandates that a debtor
timely perform all of its obligations under a lease arising post-
petition, irrespective of whether a pre-petition default exists
under the lease or whether the debtor is in arrears for any
preexisting lease obligations.5 Yet, crucially, as will be dis-
cussed below, section 365(d)(3) of the Code does not identify
the consequences of a debtor's failure to comply with this pro-
vision.'
Although the Code initially fixes the Assumption Period at
sixty days from the commencement of the case, section
365(d)(4) empowers a bankruptcy court to extend the Assump-
tion Period for "cause" if the circumstances of a particular case
so warrant. The Code does not, however, define the term
"cause." Consequently, courts have been left to develop a stan-
dard for determining the appropriateness of a request for an
extension of the Assumption Period. Not surprisingly, given
that "cause" has been a judicially-developed doctrine, the statu-
tory silence in section 365(d)(4) of the Code has provided ample
' Section 365(d)(3) states:
The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except
those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for
relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until
such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of
this title. The court may extend, for cause, the time for performance of
any such obligation that arises within 60 days after the date of the order
for relief, but the time for performance shall not be extended beyond
such 60-day period. This subsection shall not be deemed to affect the
trustees obligations under the provisions of subsection (b) or () of this
section. Acceptance of any such performance does not constitute waiver or
relinquishment of the lessors rights under such lease or under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (1994).
' See, e.g., In re Coastal Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 62 B.R. 879, 883 (Banlr.
E.DYN.Y. 1986).
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3).
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fodder for litigation concerning the appropriateness of a partic-
ular request for an extension of the Assumption Period.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit (the "Second Circuit") rendered an opinion on the
standard for obtaining an extension of the Assumption Period.
The decision significantly affects the rights of debtors and
landlords in bankruptcy cases in this jurisdiction and will
undoubtedly lead to more litigation. In South Street Seaport
Ltd. Partnership v. Burger Boys, Inc. (In re Burger Boys, Inc.),7
the Second Circuit held that a debtor's request for an extension
of the Assumption Period could not be denied merely because
the debtor failed to pay a significant amount of post-petition
rent in derogation of the express mandate of section 365(d)(3)
of the Bankruptcy Code. The Second Circuit based its conclu-
sion on the fact that section 365(d)(4) of the Code, by its terms,
does not require a debtor to be in its current post-petition
obligations in order to obtain an extension of the Assumption
Period. The Second Circuit also rested its decision on its prior
holding in Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro.' Theatre Holding
discussed, under prior law, the factors for courts to consider in
determining the proper amount of time within which a debtor
could assume or reject an unexpired nonresidential lease.
Without recognizing that Congress' inclusion of sections
365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of the Code in 1984 may have made the
Theatre Holding factors obsolete, the Second Circuit in Burger
Boys concluded that a bankruptcy court must consider multiple
factors, only one of which is whether a debtor is current in its
post-petition obligations under a lease, in determining whether
an extension of the Assumption Period is appropriate
The Second Circuit in Burger Boys may have reached the
right conclusion, but did so through flawed reasoning and a
myopic reading of section 365(d) of the Code. As a result, it
revitalized a standard for determining the appropriate length
of the Assumption Period-the Theatre Holding stan-
dard-which Congress intended to substantially modify
through enactment in 1984 of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of
the Code.' ° The Burger Boys decision has the potential to sig-
94 F.3d 755 (2d Cir. 1996).
8 681 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982).
' Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 760.
10 Under prior law, debtors had until the hearing on confirmation to decide
[Vol. 63:437
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nificantly injure landlords' economic rights because, applied
literally, the holding judicially amends the previously widely-
held view that debtors must pay post-petition rent during the
pendency of a bankruptcy case in order to obtain the benefit of
continued occupancy and additional extensions of the Assump-
tion Period. Under the Burger Boys standard, landlords are no
longer assured of timely rent payments while their ability to
enforce their rights under a lease is suspended by the opera-
tion of section 362(a) of the Code. Unchecked, the Second
Circuit's decision could allow a debtor to defer sine die the
decision to assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresiden-
tial real property and shift to the landlord the economic risk of
carrying a lease during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.
Like the statutory provision which it interprets (section
365(d)(4) of the Code), the Burger Boys decision is incomplete
and clouded by ambiguity. It fails to adequately analyze and
reconcile the statutory structure of section 365(d) of the Code
and its legislative amendments, which significantly altered the
administration of leases of nonresidential real property. Ap-
plied rotely, the holding of Burger Boys threatens to roll back
the law surrounding the time allotted a debtor to assume or
reject an unexpired lease to its pre-1984 state, which in turn
would undermine the equilibrium that is essential to the equi-
table reordering of the debtor-creditor relationship in many
chapter 11 cases. This Article discusses the Second Circuit's
decision in Burger Boys and offers a framework for interpret-
ing sections 365(d)(3) and 365(d)(4) of the Code in a manner
that would realign the rights of debtors and their landlords
with respect to unexpired leases of real property in a manner
consistent with congressional intent.
I. THE FACTS OF BURGER BOYS
In May 1983, Burger Boys Inc., the owner and operator of
a restaurant in lower Manhattan, entered into a long-term
lease with South Street Limited Partnership (the "Landlord")
whether to assume or reject their leases of nonresidential property; subject, how-
ever, to a landlord's right (and burden) to compel an earlier decision. See Theatre
Holding, 681 F.2d at 104.
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for commercial space in the South Street Seaport." When
Burger Boys signed the lease, the building had numerous ten-
ants, most of whom were also purveyors of food. In fact, there
were more than forty tenants in the building at one point, ap-
proximately twenty-two of which were restaurants.
To facilitate the renovation of its building, the Landlord of-
fered the tenants incentives to either break their leases or
relocate to another of the Landlord's nearby properties. Burger
Boys declined both of those offers and elected to remain on the
premises. Eventually, Burger Boys was the only tenant left in
the building, with nine years remaining on its lease. Because
of the extensive renovations which were in process, Burger
Boys' business floundered and they stopped paying rent. In
October 1993, the Landlord commenced nonpayment eviction
proceedings against Burger Boys in the civil court of the City
of New York (the "State Court Action"). 2 In that action, Bur-
ger Boys asserted six affirmative counterclaims alleging,
among other things, that the Landlord breached the terms of
the lease by its actions to remove the neighboring tenant res-
taurants and, as a result, no rent was owing.3
On the eve of trial in the State Court Action, Burger Boys
filed for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 As
a result of the chapter 11 filing, the Landlord's eviction pro-
ceeding (and for that matter, the entirety of the State Court
Action) was suspended by the automatic stay provision of sec-
tion 362(a) of the Code. 5 Nearly six. months into the chapter
11 case, Burger Boys commenced suit (the "Adversary Proceed-
ing") against the Landlord in the bankruptcy case, asserting
causes of action which mirrored its counterclaims in the State
Court Action. 6 The Landlord responded to the commencement
of the Adversary Proceeding by requesting that the bankruptcy
court abstain from hearing the issues raised in the Adversary
Proceeding and remand the dispute back to the state court for
adjudication of all issues surrounding the parties' rights under
the lease. The bankruptcy court ultimately agreed to ab-
" Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 758.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
1 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
16 Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 758.
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stain.17 Burger Boys appealed that decision to the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, which affirmed
the bankruptcy court's abstention ruling.
Throughout the dispute over the proper forum for adjudi-
cating the underlying nonpayment dispute, Burger Boys sought
and obtained from the bankruptcy court multiple extensions of
the Assumption Period. After the appeal was taken from the
abstention order, the bankruptcy court extended Burger Boys'
Assumption Period to the date which represented the sixtieth
day after the district court rendered a final decision on the
appeal, provided that Burger Boys remained current on its
post-petition rental obligations."
While the appeal was pending, Burger Boys stopped pay-
ing its monthly rent. Thereafter, the district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's decision to abstain.' Burger Boys then
filed another motion seeking yet a further extension of the
Assumption Period, which the Landlord opposed both on the
merits of the request and for being untimely filed. By order
dated June 7, 1995 (the "Interim Order"), the bankruptcy court
overruled the Landlord's objection to the timeliness of the
extension motion and scheduled a hearing (the "Continued
Hearing") several weeks after the date of the Interim Order to
determine whether a further extension of the Assumption
Period was warranted."0 The Interim Order, however, provid-
ed that the Continued Hearing (and thus, the continued viabil-
ity of the lease) was conditioned on Burger Boys becoming cur-
rent on its post-petition obligations under the lease. This re-
quired Burger Boys to tender payment of approximately
$77,000 before the period set forth in the Interim Order ex-
pired.2
1
When Burger Boys failed to comply with the terms of the
Interim Order, the bankruptcy court entered an order (the
"Lease Rejection Order") deeming the lease rejected as a mat-
ter of law. As the bankruptcy court explained in a subsequent
unpublished written decision, Burger Boys "failed to tender a
17 id.
1' In re Burger Boys, Inc., 183 B.R. 682, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1, Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 758.
20 Id. at 759.
21 Transcript of District Court Hearing on Appeal at 16, Burger Boys (No. 95-
5077).
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dime" to the Landlord, nor did it even offer to pay any amount
of the post-petition arrears into an escrow account.22 Burger
Boys appealed the Lease Rejection Order and sought a stay
pending appeal of the same. The bankruptcy court denied the
request for a stay pending appeal; Burger Boys, however, ob-
tained a stay of the Lease Rejection Order from the district
court.
Subsequently, the district court affirmed the decision of
the bankruptcy court on the issue of whether the request for
an extension of the Assumption Period was timely made. 3 It
disagreed, however, with the bankruptcy court's decision to
deem the lease rejected as a matter of law as a result of Bur-
ger Boys' failure to tender the post-petition arrears within the
time set forth in the Interim Order.' The district court con-
cluded, among other things, that the bankruptcy court's order
requiring Burger Boys to pay the post-petition arrears within
three weeks was "draconian" and its determination that the
lease was rejected as a matter of law clearly erroneous. The
district court thereafter granted Burger Boys a short period of
time in which to decide whether to assume or reject the lease;
the district court, however, declined to order Burger Boys to
tender any amounts to the landlord during that period.25
The Landlord thereafter appealed to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit, among other rulings, affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the bankruptcy court had erred in
deeming the lease rejected as a matter of law due to the
debtor's failure to timely pay the post-petition rent.
In so concluding, the Second Circuit relied heavily on its
prior decision in Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro.6 In Theatre
" See Decision and Order of Bankruptcy Court Denying the Debtor's Request
for a Stay Pending Appeal at 5, Burger Boys (No. 93-B-22447).
Transcript of District Court Hearing on Appeal at 17-18, Burger Boys (No.
95-5077).
2 Id. at 18-19, Burger Boys (No. 95-5077).
2' Ironically, the district court thereafter ordered Burger Boys to reach a deci-
sion as to whether it intended to assume its lease within fifteen days and to ten-
der to the court registry within fifteen days of its decision to assume the lease the
full amount of the post-petition arrears. Transcript of District Court Hearing on
Appeal at 20, Burger Boys (No. 95-5077).
26 681 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982). It should be noted that the Second Circuit in
Burger Boys agreed with a bankruptcy court decision, In re Wedtech Corp., 72
B.R. 464, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), for its rote conclusion that the factors dis-
cussed in Theatre Holding were still relevant to the courts extension determina-
[Vol. 63: 437
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Holding, which the Second Circuit decided before Congress'
enactment of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of the Code, the
Second Circuit had set forth an array of factors for the bank-
ruptcy court to consider in determining how much time was
"reasonable" for a debtor to decide whether to assume or reject
its nonresidential real property leases. Those factors included,
among others, whether the debtor was current in its post-peti-
tion rent obligations. While the Burger Boys decision refer-
enced the 1984 amendments to the Code, the Second Circuit
nonetheless concluded, with little analysis and without any
discussion of the effect of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4) on its
Theatre Holding factors, that those Theatre Holding factors
were still "relevant to a bankruptcy court's decision on a
debtor's motion for extension of time to assume or reject a
lease." 7 Because the bankruptcy court only considered one of
those factors in its determination (i.e., the timely payment of
post-petition rent), the Second Circuit concluded that the bank-
ruptcy court had erred as a matter of law.
II. ANALYSIS
The central dispute resolved by the Burger Boys decision
involves a narrow legal issue: is a debtor's timely compliance
with its post-petition lease obligations a prerequisite to-or
just one factor the bankruptcy court must consider in-the
court's granting of a debtor's request for an extension of the
Assumption Period? The combination of Congress' inclusion of
section 365(d)(3) of the Code, and that section's silence con-
cerning the appropriate remedy-if any-for a debtor's failure
to pay rent post-petition, supports two conflicting but defensi-
ble conclusions. It is entirely reasonable to conclude, as the
Second Circuit did, that timely performance of post-petition
tion even after enactment of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code.
What the Second Circuit overlooked, however, was that both Wedthec and a deci-
sion upon which Wedtech relied, In re Beker Industries Corp., 64 B-R. 890, 898
n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), each had studied the issue and concluded that the
"holding [of Theatre Holding] had been legislatively overturned with respect to
nonresidential leases of real property by the passage of subzections (d)(3) and
(d)(4) of § 365 of the Code ... [but] 'remained good law in this Circuit as to
other executory contracts ... .' " Wedtech, 72 B.R. at 471 (quoting Beer Indus.
tries Corp., 64 B.R. 890, 898 n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
' Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 761.
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obligations is not per se a precondition to an extension of the
Assumption Period. It is similarly plausible to conclude, as the
bankruptcy court did, that payment of post-petition
rent-which section 365(d)(3) mandates-is the sine qua non to
any extension of the Assumption Period.
The first conclusion employs the canon of statutory con-
struction that a statutory provision should be applied accord-
ing to its literal terms (its "plain meaning") without resort to
other statutory provisions or legislative history. The second
conclusion employs the canon of statutory construction that
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is a "holistic endeavor"
requiring reference to related provisions of the broader statuto-
ry scheme of which it is a part. Clearly, with respect to the
issue at bar, debtors fare better under the "plain meaning"
approach to section 365(d)(4)-which references only
"cause"--while landlords fare better under the "holistic" ap-
proach.
The issue raises complex questions of statutory construc-
tion and public policy, which, simply put, were overlooked by
the trilogy of Burger Boys decisions. There is no "common
sense" solution to this issue, because the statutory structure of
section 365(d) of the Code and its legislative history are un-
clear, and there are significant and diametrically opposed in-
terests at play. A workable solution requires a reconciliation by
the courts (or preferably, Congress) of the relevant provisions
of the Code with due regard to the policy concerns surrounding
protections for landlords which formed the basis of the 1984
amendments to the Code.
III. ADMINISTRATION OF LEASES GENERALLY
To set the stage for discussing the narrow, but important,
legal issue raised by the Burger Boys decision, we begin with a
brief review of the Bankruptcy Code provisions which govern
the administration of leases in bankruptcy proceedings. Sec-
tion 365 of the Code provides that direction.
As part of the restructuring of its financial affairs, a debt-
or must determine whether to "assume" (reaffirm its obliga-
tions under), or "reject" (disavow its obligations under) each of
[Vol. 63: 437
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its unexpired nonresidential leases of property.' The Code
provides that a debtor has until the hearing on the confirma-
tion of a plan of reorganization to determine whether to as-
sume or reject certain types of leases, as well as other executo-
ry contracts." Until such leases and other executory contracts
are assumed or rejected, such contractual arrangements con-
tinue "in effect and creditors are bound to honor [them]."
A pertinent exception to this rule involves the Assumption
Period relevant to unexpired nonresidential real property leas-
es; debtors are afforded sixty days from the commencement of
the bankruptcy case (subject to extensions) to assume any
unexpired lease of nonresidential real property. Unless a mo-
tion is filed3' to extend the Assumption Period prior to its con-
clusion (in some jurisdictions, an order must be entered prior
to the termination of the Assumption Period extending the
Assumption Period), the lease is deemed rejected as a matter
of law and the debtor is obligated to "immediately surrender"
the leased premises to its landlord.32
Not surprisingly, in light of the overall purpose of chapter
11, the paramount concerns facing a debtor in determining
whether to keep or dispose of a particular contract or lease are
the financial value and strategic importance of that asset to
the estate. Leases having a positive value to the estate will
ordinarily be assumed, and either maintained for the restruc-
tured entity or sold to a third party if the asset does not fit
into the debtor's long-term strategic plan." Leases that are
burdensome to the debtor's estate will almost always be reject-
ed.' 4
- See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1994); see also Nostas Assoc. v. Costich (In re
Klein Sleep Prods., Inc.), 78 F.3d 18, 29 (2d Cir. 1996); Leslie Fay Companies, Inc.
v. Corporate Property Assocs. 3 (In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc.), 166 B-R. 802
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire
Elec. Coop., Inc. (In re Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire), 884 F.2d 11, 14 (1st
Cir. 1989).
' Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 884 F.2d at 14.
" Tigr Restaurant, Inc. v. Rouse S.I. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 79 B.R. 954, 956
(Bankr. EMD.N.Y. 1987); accord Southwest Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Long
Beach (In re Southwest Aircraft Serv., Inc.), 831 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1987);
contra In re Harwitz, 167 B.R. 237 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984)
32 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1994).
Klein Sleep, 78 F.3d at 25.
"Id.
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While the assumption/rejection decision can flow from a
relatively straight forward economic analysis of the lease, that
decision can have a significant impact on the dividends paid to
creditors. Generally speaking, the Bankruptcy Code requires
that (i) claims of equal legal rank are to be grouped in a class
and paid equally, 5 and (ii) to the extent that the estate has
insufficient assets to pay all allowed claims in a class in full,
each claim receives a pro-rated distribution of any assets dis-
tributed to that class.36
The rejection of a lease invokes two distinct provisions of
the Code which, collectively, can cause a material 'shift in dis-
tributions to creditors by altering the amount and priority of
the landlord's claim against the estate for damages resulting
from the rejection. The amount and priority of a creditor's
claim against the estate is generally fixed by applicable non-
bankruptcy law, and where one exists, the terms of a con-
tract." The Code overlays a "cap" on a landlord's claim aris-
ing from the debtor's rejection of its real property lease. The
purpose of this "cap" is to "prevent a landlord's -single unse-
cured claim-which, depending on the length of the lease, may
be enormous-to elbow aside other unsecured creditors" and
swallow most of the unencumbered assets of a debtor that
would otherwise be distributed rateably to the general creditor
body.3" More specifically, section 502(b)(6) of the Code pro-
vides that upon rejection of a real property lease, a landlord's
rejection claim is limited to the lesser of one year's rent or
fifteen percent of the remaining obligations under the lease
(not to exceed a three-year term), plus any outstanding
amounts due under the lease.39
" See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4) (1994).
38 Id.
" See In re Village Rathskeller, Inc., 147 B.R. 665, 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)).
" Klein Sleep, 78 F.3d at 28; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 353 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5787, 6309; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5849; In re Leslie Fay, 166 B.R. 294 (quoting In re Bob's Sea
Ray Boats, Inc., 143 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992)).
3' 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (1994). Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code disal-
lows a landlord's lease rejection claim:
to the extent that-.. . such claim exceeds-(A) the rent reserved by
such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of one year, or 15 per-
cent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease, fol-
lowing the earlier of-(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and (ii) the
[Vol. 63: 437
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The Code also dictates the priority of a landlord's lease
rejection claim. Section 365(g)(1) of the Code provides that
irrespective of the date on which a particular lease is rejected,
upon such rejection, a legal fiction is created under which the
debtor is said to have breached the lease immediately before
the commencement of the bankruptcy case.40 Because the re-
jection is deemed to occur pre-petition, any lease rejection
claim is prioritized as an unsecured, nonpriority claim (along
with other creditor claims which did, in fact, arise prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy case).4' As general unse-
cured claims are junior in priority to secured claims and ad-
ministrative expense claims in the bankruptcy distribution
scheme (only ahead of subordinated creditors and equity inter-
ests), this creditor group typically receives substantially less
than a full distribution on account of their claims.
In contrast, if a debtor-in the prudent exercise of its
business judgment4 2-assumes a lease, the costs associated
therewith become post-petition obligations of the debtor's es-
tate (and the reorganized entity).43 Once a lease is assumed,
"it is said to be assumed cum onere; [tihe defaults are cured
but the agreement becomes property of the estate in the same
shape as it existed prior to bankruptcy, with all of its benefits
and burdens." After a lease is assumed, the law in the Sec-
ond Circuit is that any claim for damages suffered by the land-
lord, including damages that may stem from a subsequent
date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the
leased property; plus (B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without
acceleration, on the earlier of such dates.
Id.
" In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); accord In re
Episode USA, Inc., 202 B.I. 691, 696 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
41 Episode, 202 B.R. at 696.
4 See, eg., Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d
36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1989) (in considering whether to authorize rejection of an unex-
pired lease, the bankruptcy court must determine whether the debtor has demon-
strated, in its prudent business judgement, that rejection benefits the debtor's
estate (citing In re Stable Mews Assocs., Inc., 41 B.R. 594, 596 (Banhr. S.D.N.Y.
1984))); accord Riodizio, 204 B.R. at 424.
"See In re village Rathskeller, Inc., 147 B.R. 665, 671 (Bankr. S.D.Y. 1992).
"Id, (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984)).
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breach of the assumed contract, is afforded "administrative
expense priority status" which is not subject to any statutory
cap.4
5
The importance in distinction between an administrative
expense claim and an unsecured claim cannot be overstated.
The distributive provisions of the Code provide that adminis-
trative claims are entitled to be paid first from unencumbered
assets of the estate.46 Unsecured claims are typically posi-
tioned at the end of the creditor distribution line and, accord-
ingly, bear the greatest risk that they will receive less than
100 cents on the dollar. When all is said and done, unsecured
creditors typically receive "little tiny Bankruptcy Dollars,
which may be worth ten cents in U.S. dollars," while adminis-
trative claimants typically receive payment in full.
47
When this financial consequence is considered along with
the Code's requirement that a debtor must provide for the cure
of any existing default at the time that it assumes a lease,48 it
is axiomatic that a debtor has little, if any, financial incentive
to make its assumption/rejection decision earlier than it abso-
lutely must in a bankruptcy case.49
Yet, while debtors may naturally prefer to put off the lease
review process, in point of fact, debtors are often unable opera-
tionally to make assumption/rejection decisions during the
initial Assumption Period. A predicate for making such deci-
sions is the existence of a strategic plan for a debtor's emer-
gence from chapter 11. In most larger reorganizations, the
See In re Klein Sleep Prods., Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1996).
'6 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1994); accord Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Reynolds
& Reynolds Co. (In re JKJ Chevrolet, Inc.), 26 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1994).
' Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74
MINN. L. REv. 227, 253 (1989).
" More specifically, section 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code mandates that at
the time of such an assumption: (i) the debtor cure any outstanding defaults (or
provide adequate assurances that those defaults will be cured), (ii) compensate any
third party for pecuniary losses resulting from those defaults (or provide adequate
assurances that such compensation will be promptly given), and (iii) provide ade-
quate assurance of future performance under the contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)
(1994).
" Indeed, it has become commonplace in large retail chapter 11 cases for the
debtor to obtain an order extending the Assumption Period through confirmation of
a chapter 11 plan subject to the rights of landlords to seek by compulsion a
shorter Assumption Period. See, e.g., In re Gunter Hotel Associates, 96 B.R. 696
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). One could question whether such practice runs afoul of
Congress' intent in enacting section 365(d)(4).
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debtor's initial concern is to stabilize the day-to-day operations
of its business. Ordinarily, the debtor cannot review its leases
and determine which fit into its long-term business plan until
the debtor has developed such a plan. A debtor typically does
not focus on its business plan until it has stemmed the imme-
diate cause of its restructuring, restored relations with trade
vendors, negotiated (or otherwise obtained court approval of) a
stable source of cash flow and begun a detailed review of its
operations. Thus, in most cases, unless a lease is the debtor's
sole or primary asset, the debtor is in no position to make a
strategic decision concerning its lease within the first sixty
days of the reorganization."
In recognition of the potential for a debtor to be unable to
make the assumption or rejection decision post haste, the
Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor may seek as much
additional time to make the assumption/rejection decision as
the bankruptcy court, for cause, permits."' Because "cause" is
not defined in the Code nor in the legislative history to section
365, a nonexhaustive list of "judge-made" factors has evolved
to fill in the statutory void. As the Second Circuit discussed in
Burger Boys, those factors include, among others:
(1) whether the debtor is paying its post-petition rent;
(2) whether the debtor's continued occupation could damage the
landlord beyond the compensation available under the Bankruptcy
Code;
(3) whether the lease is the debtor's primary asset;
(4) whether the debtor has had sufficient time to formulate a plan of
reorganization;
(5) the complexity of the debtor's chapter 11 case;
(6) the number of leases that the debtor must evaluate;
(7) the need for a judicial determination of whether a lease ex-
ists.5
2
See, e.g., In re Wedtech Corp., 72 B.R. 464, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
5' The decision to grant or deny a motion for an extension of time to assume
or reject an unexpired nonresidential real property lease is generally within the
sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. See Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 760-61.
52 See, e.g., Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 761; Theatre Holding, 681 F.2d at 105-06;
Wedtech, 72 B.R. at 471. However, as discussed supra at note 24, one could ques-
tion whether the Theatre Holding factors, which the Burger Boys court relied up-
on, have been legislatively overruled through congressional enactment of sections
365(d)(3) and (d)(4).
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In Burger Boys, the Second Circuit concluded, as it had
previously in Theatre Holding, that the "payment of rent" fac-
tor was just that-one factor-among many to be considered in
determining the appropriate length of the Assumption Period.
However, what the Second Circuit failed to consider was that
subsequent to its decision in Theatre Holding (which spawned
these factors), Congress codified section 365(d)(3) of the Code
to expressly require the timely payment of post-petition rent
during the pendency of the Assumption Period. In so doing,
one could plausibly argue that Congress legislatively took the
"payment of rent" factor of Theatre Holding and made it into a
precondition. Given the change in the law since Theatre Hold-
ing, the continued viability of the Theatre Holding factors has
been called into question." It is to this inquiry that we now
turn.
IV. THE INTERPLAY OF SECTIONS 365(D)(3) AND 365(D)(4) OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
To answer the question of whether the timely payment of
post-petition rent is the prerequisite to-as opposed to one of
many factors to be considered in-determining whether "cause"
exists for an extension of the Assumption Period, we begin, as
the United States Supreme Court has instructed, with the
words of the governing statute.'4 Fundamental principles of
statutory construction mandate that where a statute is clear
and unambiguous on its face, the inquiry ends there and the
statute is so interpreted.55 However, where a statute's mean-
ing is ambiguous in isolation and in light of its neighboring
" Cf. In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 145 B.R. 138, 146 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (as-
serting that the doctrine of stare decisis, which is of fundamental importance to
the rule of law, requires a federal court located in the Second Circuit "to follow a
decision of the Second Circuit only when the effect of a decision has not been
nullified in some fashion ... or been questioned in subsequent decisions by the
Second Circuit itself, or has not been rendered irrelevant by changes in the posi-
tive law.").
" See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992); In re Palm Coast,
Matanza Shores Ltd. Partnership, 101 F.3d 253, 257 (2d Cir. 1996) (statutory
construction necessarily begins with the language of the statute); accord Berger v.
Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1570 (2d Cir. 1985).
r' In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Columbia Gas Sys.,
Inc., 33 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1994).
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provisions, a review of the legislative history surrounding
these statutes is needed in order to discern congressional in-
tent for the statute." Where that inquiry is unavailing, courts
are directed to look to the practice which existed prior to enact-
ment of the statute, and assume that Congress intended to
leave intact such practice absent some clear legislative declara-
tion to depart from such practice."'
Turning to the Code section at issue in Burger Boys, sec-
tion 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent
part:
[i]f the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of non-
residential real property under which the debtor is a lessee within
60 days after the date of the order for relief, or within such addi-
tional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes,
then such lease is deemed rejected and the trustee shall immediate-
ly surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor.P
Because the relevant language of section 365(d)(4) simply ref-
erences "cause," a "plain reading" of section 365(d)(4) lead the
Second Circuit in Burger Boys to conclude that the timely
payment of rent was not a precondition to an extension of the
Assumption Period, but merely one factor to be considered. The
court reasoned:
[a]lthough § 365(b)(1) may require that a debtor, before it assumes a
lease, become current on or provide adequate assurance of its pay-
ment of past-due lease obligations... , we see nothing in § 365(d)(4)
that requires a debtor to be current [in its post-petition rent pay-
ments] before the Bankruptcy Court grants a motion for an exten-
sion of time.5'
One need not disagree with the Second Circuit's decision
in Burger Boys to let stand the district court's ruling on this
point to quarrel with the analytical approach it employed in
arriving at its conclusion. The analysis espoused by the Second
Circuit in Burger Boys is appropriate for a statutory provision
which is clear on its face and not subject to alternative inter-
pretation. Here, however, we believe that section 365(d) of the
" Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 761 (1992).
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990)
(court should not read the Bankruptcy Code to erase po3t-petition practice absent
a clear indication that Congress intended such departure).
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 761.
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Bankruptcy Code is an integrated statutory scheme which has
been designed (and redesigned) to balance important, and, at
times, competing interests. Where, as in this instance, a
provision's language is ambiguous or part of a broader statuto-
ry scheme, courts "are not free to legislate but instead [are
obligated to] look to the supporting legislative history, and, if
necessary, to [prior] practice."0 The Second Circuit in Burger
Boys ignored this canon of construction.
Contrary to the Second Circuit's Burger Boys' reasoning,
section 365(d)(4) of the Code is not clear and unambiguous on
its face and therefore cannot be analyzed in isolation to discern
its meaning."' The existence of an ill-defined benchmark,
"cause," in section 365(d)(4), necessarily renders this provision
vague and unintelligible in isolation.62 Because section
365(d)(4) of the Code does not afford clear guidance as to what
constitutes "cause," resort to legislative history is appropri-
ate.' Said differently, section 365(d)(4) of the Code must be
viewed in light of the remainder of the statutory scheme (and,
in particular, section 365(d)(3)) because only through such a
"holistic" approach can the words of the statute be interpreted
in a manner consistent with Congress' intent in enacting it;
namely, the protection of landlord rights in chapter 11 cas-
es.64
At the outset, it is important to remember that section
365(d)(4) (like its companion section 365(d)(3)) was enacted as
part of the 1984 amendment to the Code. Prior to the 1984
' Hooker, 162 B.R. at 426 (citing In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assoc., 209 B.R. 314
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)); accord Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992)
("ITihis Court has been reluctant to accept arguments thbat would interpret the
Code, however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to
effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some
discussion in the legislative history.").
6 See In re Palm Coast, Matanza Shores Ltd. Partnership, 101 F.3d 253, 257
(2d Cir. 1996) ("Where the scope of a statutory provision is not made crystal clear
by the language of the provision, it is appropriate to turn to the legislative history
of the statute.") (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1571 (2d Cir. 1985));
see also Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410; U.S. v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35-36
(1992); Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
62 See, e.g., Chapman Inv. Assocs. v. American Healthcare Management, 94
B.R. 420, 421 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (stating that, "the meaning of the words of section
365(d)(4) are not clear").
Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1982).
6' United States v. Timbers, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
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amendments, chapter 11 debtors typically had a "reasonable"
period of time to determine whether to assume or reject unex-
pired leases of real property.' During this open-ended "rea-
sonable" period, which often extended for months on end, there
was no statutory obligation for a debtor to timely pay its post-
petition rent and disputes arose not only with respect to the
timing of payments, but also with respect to the amount of
rent owing. As one court recounted, "[pirior to the 1984 enact-
ment of § 365(d)(3), the payment of post-petition lease obliga-
tions prior to assumption or rejection was governed by 11
U.S.C. 503(b)(1).'6 There were often debates concerning
whether the debtor was liable for the rent reserved under the
lease or some other amount. If the landlord could not live with
this open-ended Assumption Period, the landlord carried the
burden of forcing a debtor to make its assumption/rejection
decision on a particular lease sooner than at a confirmation
hearing.' As history demonstrates, this statutory framework
did not work.
In 1984, Congress-in an effort to provide landlords with
greater protection in chapter 11 cases-enacted sections
365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of the Code. The legislative history to the
1984 amendments makes clear that the underlying purpose of
congressional enactment of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of the
Code was to "remedy serious problems caused [to] shopping
centers and their solvent tenants by the adminitration of the
[Blankruptcy [Clode." s In addition to the issues just de-
scribed, other problems included the detrimental effect that
long-term vacancy or partial operation of space caused to "cus-
tomer traffic," and, in turn, business opportunities in shopping
malls, and the detrimental effect on the landlord and neigh-
boring tenants of the debtor's failure to timely pay rent.'
Id.; see also Theatre Holding, 681 F.2d at 104.
See Newman v. McCrory Corp. (In re McCrory Corp.), 210 B. 934, 936
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
In re Beker Indus. Corp., 64 B.R. 890, 896 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
See 130 CONG. REC. S8,894 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarls of Sen.
Hatch); accord In re Orient River Inves., Inc., 112 Ba. 126, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1990) ("The 1984 Bankruptcy Code amendments... were added to strengthen the
position of landlords.").
t, 130 CONG. REC. S8,894-95 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
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As the Congressional Record explains:
The first problem which this bill would remedy is the long-term
vacancy or partial operation of space by a bankrupt tenant. Al-
though in a chapter 7 case the bankruptcy code presently requires
that the trustee decide whether to assume or reject an unexpired
lease within 60 days after the bankruptcy petition is filed, there is
no deadline for this decision in a chapter 11 case. Because of the
unprecedented number of bankruptcy cases and the consequent
delays in the Bankruptcy Courts, tenant space has been vacated for
extended periods of time before the Bankruptcy Court forced the
trustee to decide whether to assume or reject the lease. During this
time, the other tenants of the shopping center are hurt because of
the reduced customer traffic in the shopping center. Tenants and
landlords in other nonresidential structures have encountered simi-
lar problems.
The bill would lessen the problems caused by extended vacan-
cies and partial operation of tenant space by requiring that the
trustee decide whether to assume or reject nonresidential real prop-
erty lease within 60 days after the order for relief in a case under
any chapter. This time period could be extended by the court for
cause, such as in exceptional cases involving large numbers of leas-
es. One of the minor changes in this subtitle was to limit it to non-
residential real property leases. If the lease is not assumed or reject-
ed within this 60-day period, or any additional period granted by the
court, the lease is deemed rejected and the trustee must immediate-
ly surrender the property to the lessor.
A second and related problem is that during the time the debt-
or has vacated space but has not yet decided whether to assume or
reject the lease, the trustee has stopped making payments due un-
der the lease.... In this situation, the landlord is forced to provide
current services-the use of its property, utilities, security, and
other services-without current payment. No other creditor is put in
this position. In addition, the other tenants often must increase
their common area charge payments to compensate for the trustee's
failure to make the required payments for the debtor.
The bill would lessen these problems by requiring the trustee
to perform all the obligations of the debtor under a lease of nonresi-
dential real property at the time required in the lease. This timely
performance requirement will insure that debtor-tenants pay their
rent, common area, and other charges on time pending the trustee's
assumption or rejection of the lease. For cause, the court can extend
the time for performance of obligations due during the first 60 days
after the order for relief, but not beyond the end of such 60-day
period. At the end of this period, the amounts due during the first
60 days would be required to be paid, and thereafter, all obligations
must be performed on time. This permissible 60-day grace period is
intended to give the trustee time to determine what lease obliga-
tions the debtor has and to locate the cash to make the required
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payments in exceptionally large or complicated cases....°
In short, in 1984 Congress created an initially infinite yet
flexible Assumption Period (thus doing away with the concept
of a "reasonable period") and made clear that the debtor was
required to timely pay the amount of rent reserved under the
lease until the assumption/rejection decision had been made.
Noticeably absent from the legislative history to section 365(d)
is any discussion of the appropriate penalty for a debtor's fail-
ure.to timely comply with its post-petition obligations under a
lease of nonresidential real property. Nor does the legislative
history to section 365(d) express a congressional intent to link
the extension of the Assumption Period to the timely payment
of rent, although the legislative history does imply such a link
by prominently discussing the financial hardships caused by
these two "related issues" and the congressional desire to less-
en the problems which commonly befell landlords. Yet, while
Congress plainly desired to ensure that debtors paid their rent
during their continued occupancy of the leased space, it failed
to lay out what consequences would befall the debtor who
failed to comply with these obligations. 1
V. EARLY DECIsIoNAL LAW INTERPRETING THE 1984
AMENDMENTS
Early post-1984 amendment decisional law interpreting
the changes to section 365(d) of the Bankruptcy Code appar-
ently favored the bright line view that a debtor's timely pay-
ment of post-petition rent was a prerequisite to the courts
consideration of a request for an extension of the Assumption
Period.
In In re Tandem Group, Inc.,72 for example, the chapter
11 debtor-- which manufactured wood office furniture and seat-
ing-sought an extension of the Assumption Period with re-
spect to a lease which was its primary asset. The debtor had
not paid any post-petition rent, and not surprisingly, the land-
lord opposed the requested extension. While finding that the
debtor had demonstrated "cause" sufficient to be granted an
70 Id.
"' See infra pp. 458-60 and note 77.
72 60 B.R 125 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
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extension of the 365(d)(4) time, the Tandem court concluded
such an extension would be expressly conditioned upon the
debtor's becoming current in its post-petition obligations. Cit-
ing In re Condominium Administrative Services, Inc. 3 and the
legislative history to the 1984 amendments to the Code, the
Tandem court concluded that "to preserve the ability to assume
the lease, the debtor, or trustee, must perform all lease obliga-
tions during the sixty-day period and during any court-autho-
rized extension [of the 365(d)(4) period]."74 Absent such per-
formance, no extension of the Assumption Period would be
granted. Thus, while not expressly holding that section
365(d)(4) says as much on its face, the Tandem court found by
reasoning that the payment of post-petition rent was the sine
qua non to the court's granting of an extension of the Assump-
tion Period. Other lower courts, by similarly analogous reason-
ing, have reached the same conclusion. 5
VI. SOUTHWEST AIRCRAFT AND ITS PROGENY
Other courts have refused to espouse this "bright line"
interpretation of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4). In In re South-
west Aircraft Services, Inc.,76 the debtor sought an extension
of the Assumption Period. However, the debtor had failed to
pay a significant amount of post-petition rent. At the hearing
on the debtor's extension motion, the debtor tendered its land-
lord checks for all outstanding post-petition rent, which the
landlord refused. One issue, among others, was the effect of
the debtor's nonpayment of post-petition rent on the ability of
the court to grant an extension of the Assumption Period.
73 55 B.R. 792 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985)
71 See Tandem Group, 60 B.R. at 125, 127.
71 See In re Mr. Gatti's, Inc., 164 B.R. 929, 933 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994)
("[p]resumably, the failure of a debtor to comply [with section 365(d)(3)] would
cause a motion to extend time [to assume or reject] to also be denied."); see also
In re Muir Training Techs., Inc., 120 B.R. 154, 158, (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) ("the
express language of § 365(d)(3), its legislative history and the case law interpret-
ing this section require a debtor or trustee to satisfy their [sic] lease obligations
during the 60 day assumption/rejection period and any court authorized exten-
sion"); Corporate Prop. Inves. v. Chandel Enters., Inc., (In re Chandel Enterprises,
Inc.), 64 B.R. 607, 610 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (timely payments under the lease
are required by section 365(d)(3) during the 60 day period and any extension
thereof).
76 831 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Initially the Southwest court noted that, unlike its com-
panion provision (section 365(d)(4)), section 365(d)(3) "does not
expressly state what consequences follow from a debtor's viola-
tion of its terms."' The court found the Tandem "bright line"
interpretation of sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4), which the land-
lord espoused, to be "draconian" in nature, and instead con-
cluded that the payment of rent was but one factor to be con-
sidered in the overall "cause" inquiry. Specifically, the South-
west court held that:
[w]e believe that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to have
the discretion to consider all of the particular facts and circumstanc-
es involved in each bankruptcy case and to decide whether the con-
sequence of a violation of subsection (d)(3) should be forfeiture of the
unassumed lease, some other penalty, or no penalty at all. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the failure to make payments under subsection
(d)(3) constitutes simply one element to be considered, along with all
the other relevant factors, in determining whether cause exists un-
der subsection (d)(4) to extend the 60-day period for assumption or
rejection.'8
Several-lower courts have reached the same conclusion. In
In re Wedtech Corp. (which was cited with approval in South-
west and by the Second Circuit in Burger Boys), the debtor
moved for an extension of the Assumption Period with respect
to two nonresidential real property leases.79 The landlord ob-
jected because the debtor had failed to pay significant post-
petition rent. The Wedtech court applied four of the Theatre
Holding factors in its extension determination: (1) whether the
debtor had made post-petition payments for the use of the
property; (2) whether the lease was the debtor's primary asset,
such that the decision to assume or reject would be central to
any chapter 11 plan; (3) whether the debtor had sufficient time
to intelligently make an assumption/rejection decision; and
(4) whether such an extension would damage the landlord
' Section 365(d)(4) provides that if the court does not extend the Assumption
Period, or if the lease has not yet been assumed or rejected prior to the expiration
of the Assumption Period, the lease is automatically deemed rejected as a matter
of law.
78 Southwest, 831 F.2d at 854. The court also held that the Condominium hold-
ing was made "without citation of authority except for a wholly unsupported refer-
ence to 'legislative history'." Id.
"' In re Wedtech Corp., 72 B.I 464, 466 (Banhr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also In re
Westview 74th Street Drug Corp., 59 B.R. 747, 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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beyond the compensation available under the Bankruptcy
Code. ° After analyzing these Theatre Holding factors and
additional factors utilized by other courts, the Wedtech court
held that the payment of post-petition rent was not itself a
prerequisite to seeking an extension of the Assumption Period.
In reaching this conclusion, the Wedtech court declined to
adopt the position that the payment of rent was a prerequisite
to a finding of "cause," even though it recognized that the "pay-
ment" factor should be afforded greater weight in the court's
decision than any of the other factors.
Similarly, in In re Babylon Ltd. Partnership,"' the debtor
operated a nightclub in Manhattan pursuant to a seven year
lease which was indisputably its principal asset. Shortly after
filing for chapter 11 relief, the debtor moved for an extension
of the Assumption Period. The landlord objected, arguing, inter
alia, that the debtor's failure to timely make post-petition rent
payments, coupled with the debtor's inability to fund its rental
obligations solely from its revenues, mandated that the court
deny the debtor's requested extension of the Assumption Peri-
od. Like the Wedtech court, the Babylon court looked to
Theatre Holding for guidance, and in so doing, concluded that
the timely payment of post-petition rent was but one of many
factors the court should consider in making a section 365(d)(4)
extension decision.82 Unlike the Wedtech court, however, the
Babylon court went on to grant the requested extension of the
Assumption Period, conditioned upon the "timely payment of
[post-petition] rent."
VII. RECONCILING THE DIFFERING VIEWS
The statutory framework which governs and, in certain
instances, modifies, the contractual rights of debtors and land-
lords in bankruptcy proceedings (section 365(d)) is silent on the
consequences that flow from a debtor's failure to timely per-
form its post-petition obligations under an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property. Outside the bankruptcy context,
the rights of the landlord and tenant are clearly defined, with
See Wedtech Corp., 72 B.R. at 471-72.
In re Babylon Ltd. Partnership, 76 B.R. 270 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
62 See id. at 274.
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eviction and abatement generally representing the two judicial
extremes of possible results flowing from the tenant's nonpay-
ment of rent. The invocation of bankruptcy proceedings over-
lays upon the typical landlord-tenant dispute the protection of
the interests of creditors and other interested parties in pre-
serving the valuable assets of a debtor (i.e., its lease), even if
the debtor is delinquent in doing all that can be done to pre-
serve these assets. The schisms that result from the intersec-
tion of these competing interests are not new, as Congress
recognized in attempting to address the situation through the
1984 amendments to the Code.
While the legislative history makes it clear that in enact-
ing sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4), Congress intended to provide
better protection for landlords' economic interests in bankrupt-
cy proceedings, section 365(d) has been iriterpreted by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Burger Boys in a manner which effectively nulli-
fies the intended economic protections of the 1984 amendments
by authorizing extensions of the Assumption Period in the ab-
sence of timely rent payments by the debtor. Indeed, a plain
reading of the Burger Boys decision suggests that a debtor can
be eight months behind in its post-petition rent and still not be
per se precluded from obtaining the benefit of an extension of
the Assumption Period. Permitting the debtor to drag out the
Assumption Period without at least providing the landlord
with the economic benefit of its bargain certainly cannot be
what Congress intended in enacting the 1984 amendments
and, most likely, not what the Second Circuit intended either.
Fortunately, there is a middle ground and a workable solution
which is discernable from the statute, the legislative history
and the trilogy of Burger Boys decisions.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that while the
analysis employed by the Second Circuit in Burger Boys is
subject to question, the result is not. It cannot be seriously
disputed that Burger Boys' nonpayment of eight months of
post-petition rent seems wrong and fails the "smell" test. None-
theless, applying principles of statutory construction demon-
strates that deeming the lease rejected as a matter of law for
the debtor's nonpayment of rent, which was the result the
bankruptcy court in Burger Boys reached, was not the proper
remedy for the debtor's breach of section 365(d)(3) either.
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Section 365(d)(3) states that the debtor must make timely
payments of rent; it does not state that a failure to do so is
fatal to the debtor's interest in the lease or its ability to dem-
onstrate "cause" under section 365(d)(4) for an extension of the
Assumption Period.' The legislative history contains no dis-
cussions of the effect of a debtor's nonpayment of rent on its
ability to obtain extensions of the Assumption Period. Indeed,
prior to 1984, the case law was clear that a debtor's failure to
pay post-petition rent did not per se result in a forfeiture of
the lease, although the debtor's time to assume or reject a
lease could be shortened where the post-petition rent was not
timely paid. Accordingly, based upon principles of statutory
construction, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the
penalties for a debtor's failure to timely fulfill its post-petition
obligations are either (i) the automatic denial of an extension
of the Assumption Period, or (ii) an immediate forfeiture of the
lease.
While we agree that it is wrong to employ the "bright
line," "no payment, no extension" test that the Tandem Group,
Babylon, and Burger Boys bankruptcy courts did, we similarly
acknowledge that adopting the test employed by the Second
Circuit in Burger Boys (itself a restatement of the Theatre
Holding factors) does not work either, since this framework
does not give effect to the fundamental changes to the Code
Congress implemented by the enactment of the 1984 amend-
ments. To prevent the gamesmanship and costly litigation that
were the subject of the Burger Boys case, we believe that bank-
ruptcy courts (or ideally, Congress) must delineate and enforce
strict criteria for an extension of the Assumption Period which
reflect the underlying purposes of section 365 of the Code and
the 1984 amendments.' Stated differently, the framework set
' See In re Westview 74th Street Drug Corp., 59 B.R. at 752. The Westuiew
court noted:
[tihat § 365(d)(3) contains no . . .forfeiture provision is beyond dispute,
Certainly, Congress knew how to achieve a forfeiture had it intended one,
for § 365(d)(4) deems a lease rejected upon failure to assume or reject it
within 60 days or such extended period as the court fixes and directs the
trustee to immediately surrender the leases of nonresidential property to
the lessor, without the necessity of any eviction proceedings under state
law. But equally beyond dispute is the failure of § 365(d)(3) to proscribe
any result for violation of its mandate.
Id.
s, See id. at 754-755 (recognizing that the 'aims" of section 365 of the Code is
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out by the Second Circuit in Theatre Holding, which the court
used as authority for its decision in Burger Boys, must be up-
dated.
Ironically, the district court and Second Circuit decisions
in Burger Boys demonstrate, sub-silentio, a solution which
protects the interests of debtors, landlords and other interested
parties, while giving a cohesive meaning to each of the provi-
sions of section 365(d). In the Burger Boys case, a point of
equilibrium was achieved when the debtor, eight months in
arrears of its post-petition obligations, was denied any further
extensions of the Assumption Period but afforded the neces-
sary time period in which to move to assume or reject the
lease. This practical result avoided the automatic forfeiture of
a valuable estate asset which, if lost, would have prejudiced
the interests of the debtor's other creditors. At the same time,
the result protected the landlord's rights by denying the debtor
more time to make the assumption/rejection decision. Said
differently, the result recognized that the privilege of an exten-
sion of the Assumption Period cannot be bestowed upon a
debtor that is both harming the landlord economically (through
its nonpayment of rent) and keeping the landlord in the dark
with respect to its long-term strategic plan for the lease at
issue.
While the district court's approach in the Burger Boys case
establishes a balance of the competing interests that will likely
be appropriate in most cases, this solution should not be ap-
plied as an inflexible or "bright line" rule for determining the
appropriateness of an extension of the Assumption Period.'
Notwithstanding the general appeal of this approach, we be-
to protect (but not enhance) the interests of landlords upon the banluptcy of a
tenant).
I See id. at 753, citing 2 King, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9I 365.-03121 at 365-
31 (15th ed. 1985):
Termination of the period in which to assume or reject . . . does not
work a forfeiture, for although the debtor may be forced to make a quich
decision, it is not prevented from assuming the lease. Mo3t assuredly,
the debtor's failure to keep current on its post-petition obligations to its
landlord is a factor which should weigh heavily in favor of limiting the
debtor's right to maintain the lease in limbo, but the existence of such
defaults should not effect an automatic termination of the leasehold inter-
est.
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lieve that a bankruptcy court has the authority, in the extraor-
dinary case, to approve alternatives which protect the rights of
landlords while avoiding the forfeiture of potentially valuable
assets which courts of equity (like the bankruptcy courts) so
abhor.86 For example, there is no reason why a bankruptcy
court, faced with an extension motion filed by a debtor who is
delinquent in making post-petition rent payments, cannot
condition a further extension-and thus a finding of
"cause"-on the debtor's becoming current on its post-petition
obligations." We do not see this result as "draconian," but
rather the practical application of a statute seemingly designed
primarily towards ensuring that landlords get paid the contrac-
tual amounts due them during the pendency of the chapter 11
case.
Where there is a bona fide dispute concerning the exis-
tence of the underlying lease or the amount of post-petition
rent, if any, which is owing, the bankruptcy court has the
ability to fashion a remedy which considers extenuating
circumstances presented and which adequately protects the
interests of both the debtor and its landlord. For example, if
the debtor disputes the amount of obligation owing, the bank-
ruptcy court can simply require the debtor to escrow with the
court the amount of post-petition rent in dispute until the
amount of the debtor's obligations under the lease is properly
adjudicated. This option may also be appropriate where there
is evidence of post-petition malfeasance on the part of the land-
lord. In this way, even though the landlord has no present
right to the escrowed funds (which would earn interest at pre-
vailing market rates), the landlord would be assured of its
ability to collect the outstanding rent from the debtor if the
court ultimately upholds the landlord's legal position. In the
meantime, the court retains the ability to protect the parties
from any unintended economic prejudice that may arise on a
case by case basis." It is crucial to remember, however, that
:' See Westview 74th Street Drug Corp., 59 B.R. at 753-54.
'7 In re Family Showtime Theatres, Inc., 58 B.R. 679, 684 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986).
" Interestingly, the decisions of the Second Circuit and the district court in
Burger Boys touch upon-but do not explore-the effect of the bankruptcy court's
decision deferring to the state court the underlying lease disputes. The debtor's
right to assume the lease presumed, in the first instance, a finding by the state
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court of the continued existence of the lease. The district court directed the debtor
to make its assumption/rejection determination without the state court issues being
fully resolved. This "business judgment" determination made prior to a judicial
finding of the continued viability of the lease brings squarely into focus the Second
Circuit's prior decisions in Orion Pictures Corp. v. Swwtime Networs, Inc. (In re
Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993), and Hart EnutL Management
Corp. v. Sanshoe Worldwide Corp. (In re Sanshoe Worldwide Corp.), 993 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1993).
In Sanshoe, the Second Circuit focused on the bankruptcy court's obligation to
resolve the disputed status of a lease in connection with the debtor's motion to
assume that lease. The debtor in Sanshoe leased space and subleased a portion of
it. Prior to the chapter 11 filing date, the state court had issued a warrant of
eviction. The landlord subsequently accepted rent, and never executed upon the
warrant. Post-petition, the debtor sought authority to assume and assign the lease
and sublease. The sublessee objected, arguing that the issuance of the warrant of
eviction had the effect of terminating the prime lease and sublease. The bankrupt-
cy court permitted the debtor to assume and assign whatever interest it held in
the lease without first determining the continued existence of that lease.
On appeal, both the district and circuit courts disagreed with the bankruptcy
court's approach. Each concluded that section 365(c)(3) requires the bankruptcy
court to make a "threshold" inquiry into the continued existence of a lease prior to
permitting the debtor to assume the same.
Not four months later in Orion, the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy
court for doing precisely that which Sansoe had directed. In Orion, the debtor
attempted to assume a pre-petition licensing and distribution contract which the
other party thereto (Showtime) claimed the debtor had breached. The debtor filed
its assumption motion and commenced an adversary proceeding against Showtime,
asserting anticipatory breach. The debtor sought money damages, specific perfor-
mance and authority to assume the agreement.
The bankruptcy court held a trial on the breach issue in connection with the
assumption motion; finding no breach by the debtor, the bankruptcy court autho-
rized assumption. The district court affirmed, but the Second Circuit reversed.
Orion, 4 F.3d at 1095. The Second Circuit found that a motion to assume under
section 365 is a summary proceeding involving the 'business judgment" decision of
whether assumption benefits or burdens the estate. Given the summary nature of
this proceeding, the Second Circuit continued, section 365 does not authorize the
bankruptcy court to resolve questions involving the validity of agreements in the
context of assumption motions, especially since doing so could "usurp litigants'
Seventh Amendment jury-trial rights." Id. Instead, the Second Circuit suggested
that the bankruptcy court should don blinders and consider only whether assump-
tion makes "business sense." Id- at 1099.
Interestingly, Orion did not cite Sanshoe, notwithstanding that Second Circuit
Judge Oakes sat on both the Orion and Sanshoe panels. Subsequent lower court
decisions have either noted the seeming inconsistency in the Second Circuit's Orion
and Sanswe decisions, see, e.g., In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 68 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994) ('Orion silently departed from Sanswe"), or attempted to reconcile
these decisions, see In re 611 Sixth Avenue Corp., 191 B.R. 295, 301 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996). However, to date, the Second Circuit has not reconciled these
seemingly divergent views. Thus, practitioners in this Circuit are left in the pre-
carious situation of often times having to move to assume a lease before the legal
issue of the continued viability of the lease is resolved.
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in either event, a debtor's failure to cure its post-petition de-
faults should not cause an immediate forfeiture of its lease,
although it should ordinarily preclude an extension of the As-
sumption Period. Thus, if at any point in the chapter 11 pro-
cess, the debtor stops paying post-petition rent, the court
should normally deny a further extension of the Assumption
Period and direct a debtor to decide sooner than it otherwise
would whether to assume or reject the lease.
The bankruptcy court could also create a hybrid of these
solutions and find "cause" for an extension of the Assumption
Period without the direct payment of post-petition rent. For
example, where a debtor is suffering at the outset of the case
from a temporary cash flow drain, a bankruptcy court has the
authority to defer a debtor's obligation to timely perform its
post-petition obligation for the duration of the initial Assump-
tion Period."9 At the conclusion of the initial Assumption Peri-
od, the debtor is bound to cure any post-petition arrears. How-
ever, at least for the first sixty days of the case, the debtor
could avoid making rent payments. This might afford the debt-
or the "breathing spell" it requires to focus on its business and
long-term viability. At the same time, however, the landlord is
assured of receiving its rent, even if it comes sixty days lat-
er.
90
While such a declaratory judgment action may be commenced so as to run on
a parallel track with the assumption motion, the fact remains that a trial on the
continued viability of the lease may be protracted and litigated in a different court
than the assumption motion and may take longer to resolve. In addition, the re-
sult under Orion makes little sense. If the goal of chapter 11 is the expeditious
rehabilitation of a business, it makes little sense for a debtor to develop a busi-
ness plan (and chapter 11 plan of reorganization) around a lease which may be
the cornerstone of its business and assume the lease, only to have the lease later
"swiped out" from under its feet (and its chapter 11 plan scrapped as a result)
under a judicial finding that the lease had previously expired under governing
state law. Debtors need to know with certainty and expediency their rights under
their leases. However, until the Second Circuit reconciles Orion and Sanshoe, its
attempt to preserve litigants' jury-trial rights may also lead to the collapse of a
debtor's emergence efforts.
89 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (1994).
" While section 365(d)(3) provides on its face that the debtor can defer its
obligations only during the initial Assumption Period, there appears to be no busi-
ness or policy reason to limit a bankruptcy court's authority to grant such relief
only during the initial sixty days of the bankruptcy proceeding. Indeed, limiting a
court's ability to grant debtors a temporary reprieve from paying its rent to only
the initial Assumption Period would tend to doom its value since a debtor would
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CONCLUSION
The rehabilitative process contemplated by chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code provides a troubled entity with a "snug
harbor"' in which to restructure its affairs free from the
mounting threats of a chaotic dismemberment at the hands of
its disenchanted creditors. The ante for a debtor to partake in
this supervised and equitable process is that additional preju-
dice should not be foisted upon those parties that continue to
do business with the debtor while it is restructuring. In the
context of non-residential leases of real property, Congress
recognized the importance to the restructuring process of a
balanced landlord-debtor relationship and codified sections
365(d)(3) and (d)(4) of the Code in 1984. Because an orderly
landlord-debtor relationship is often a key to a debtor's reorga-
nization (and long-term) prospects, there is, quite simply no
substitute for the payment of post-petition rent while the lease
is being reviewed during the Assumption Period.
While neither section 365(d)(3) or (d)(4) of the Code link a
debtor's ability to obtain an extension of the Assumption Peri-
od to the timely payment of post-petition rent, to conclude oth-
erwise calls into question the point of equilibrium Congress
attempted to establish through enactment of the 1984 amend-
ments. The flaw in the Second Circuit's decision in Burger
Boys was that it limited its analysis to a review of the text of
section 365(d)(4) of the Code. Section 365(d)(4) of the Code
cannot be read in isolation. Focusing solely on the language of
section 365(d)(4), as the Second Circuit did in Burger Boys,
may lead practitioners to the wrong conclusion that debtors
need no longer comply with section 365(d)(3) before they seek
extensions of the Assumption Period. This conclusion is not
supported by either the language of section 365(d)(4) of the
Code or the legislative history supporting it.
To give proper meaning to the statute and to effect the
result we believe Congress intended, courts should interpret
sections 365(d)(3) and (d)(4) in a manner that makes clear that
not ordinarily have reason to seek authority to defer payment of post-petition rent
prior to the conclusion of the initial Assumption Period.
" See Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America (In re JLM,
Inc.), 210 B.R. 19, 21 (2d Cir. BAP 1997).
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the timely payment of post-petition rent is a crucial factor in
the bankruptcy court's consideration of whether "cause" exists
to extend the Assumption Period. If the debtor fails to comply
with section 365(d)(3) of the Code's requirement, the lease is
not rejected as a matter of law. However, the debtor should
ordinarily lack the ability to convince the bankruptcy court to
grant further extensions of the Assumption Period. Thus, the
debtor will be forced to make a prompt assumption/rejection
decision. While from a landlord's perspective, this result is not
as appealing as a forfeiture of the lease, this alternative 'does
create a ceiling on the landlord's continued economic risk. If
.the debtor moves to assume the lease, the debtor will have to
cure all existing defaults (both pre- and post-petition) at the
time of assumption and provide adequate assurances that, on
an ongoing basis, the debtor will be able to make its rent pay-
ments.2 If the debtor rejects the lease, the landlord's unpaid
post-petition rent claim will be paid as an administrative ex-
pense claim of the estate (assuming the estate is not
administratively insolvent), while the landlord's "rejection"
claim will be an unsecured claim capped by section 502(b)(6) of
the Bankruptcy Code. At bottom, however, the bankruptcy
court should endeavor to fashion a remedy which protects the
economic rights of the landlord, the debtor, and the debtor's
remaining creditor body.
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1994).
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